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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, judicial review came early and with rela-
tive ease following the foundation of the new nation. The power of
the courts to declare laws unconstitutional was implicitly recog-
nized in the constitutional arrangement even before the Federal
Constitution was ratified,1 and was announced in a concurring
opinion in the Supreme Court as early as 1798.2 Marbury v.
Madison3 established the principle of judicial review as a rule of
law. Although there was judicial resistance to the rule, even its
most articulate opponents eventually altered their views." Foreign
jurists have often suggested that judicial review is the most signifi-
cant contribution by the United States to Western jurisprudence.5
The comparative significance of judicial review lies in its adoption
by many nations with constitutional systems of government.6 The
particular variations created by adopting countries are as interest-
ing and instructive as the rule, because they indicate the richness
of diverse legal traditions, the difficulty of reconciling within a sin-
gle legal system principles derived from the different traditions,
and the ingenuity of lawyers and judges everywhere in adjusting
foreign traditions to meet national needs.
This richness, difficulty, and ingenuity in adaptations are best
illustrated by the legal systems of Latin America. As colonies of
Spain and Portugal, this area of the world exercised virtually no
governmental authority over its own affairs.7 Newly independent
Latin American states in the early nineteenth century faced, for
1. Hamilton observed in Federalist paper No. 78:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a funda-
mental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there
should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has
the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the
people to the intention of their agents.
2. See the opinion of Iredell, J., in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798).
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. Chief Justice John Bannister Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, whose dis-
senting opinion in Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 343-358 (Pa. 1825) (written when
Gibson was an associate justice) is a classic argument against judicial review, later acknowl-
edged the power of courts to decide the constitutionality of statutes in Norris v. Clymer, 2
Pa. 277, 281 (1845).
5. See, e.g., A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 98-101 (H. Reeve trans. 1945).
6. See M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 25-7 (1971).
7. C. GIBSON, SPAIN IN AMERICA 90-111 (1967); J. ELLIOTT, IMPERIAL SPAIN 167-78 (1966).
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the first time, the opportunity (and the need) to develop national
legal systems. These states naturally gravitated toward the Roman
law tradition of the European Continent, which had been the basis
of the legal systems of the old colonial powers. In the tradition of
the Enlightenment, Latin American jurists sought to adopt the
most advanced models for their governmental institutions.8 In law,
this included the United States Constitution and various constitu-
tional principles drawn from England." Thus, while the Latin
American nations took the great body of their law from the Conti-
nent, particularly from France and Spain, they also looked to Eng-
land or, more often, the United States in matters relating to gov-
ernmental structure and power, and constitutional protection of
human rights. In theory, this might not present problems, because
it could be said that the best models, whatever their temporal ori-
gins, ultimately would be harmonious. In practice, however, there
were conflicts, and these conflicts were nowhere more apparent
than in constitutional law, where lawyers and judges trained in the
civil law were required to deal with subject-matter whose applica-
tion presupposed common law training and institutions. 10
The Roman law systems had little basis for the exercise of ju-
dicial control over the operation of the other branches of govern-
8. GRIFFIN, THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND LATIN AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE, in WHITAKER,
LATIN AMERICA AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 119-43 (2d ed. 1961).
9. H. DAVIS, LATIN AMERICAN THOUGHT. A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 36 (1972).
10. The matter is put quite clearly in Jafiin, New World Constitutional Harmony, 42
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 561-62, 564 (1942):
The Constitutional Fathers [in the United States] did not invent new con-
stitutional machinery to protect the Bill of Rights. Instead, they used the old
machinery of the Common Law for this purpose; as lawyers brought up in the
Common Law tradition and as disciples of Blackstone, they did not deem it nec-
essary to implement the new constitutional ideology with new apparatus. In
other words, the historic methods used for centuries in England to dispose of
litigated disputes between private individuals were borrowed to provide protec-
tion to the Bill of Rights and other constitutional guarantees. . . .Once the
Latin-American republic realized the necessity of protecting the Bill of Rights
and thereby translating American constitutional ideology into action, they were
faced with a serious problem. Where could they find appropriate machinery for
the purpose. In the United States? No. America merely borrowed from England
the Common Law machinery, which was not suitable to Latin-America. In the
Old World? No. For the general administration of justice the machinery of the
Napoleonic Code was available; but obviously 19th century Europe provided no
machinery to safeguard constitutional guarantees; the Old World was dominated
by Napoleon, Metternick, and Bismarck, and the protection of the Bill of Rights
was unthought of-except by the authors of unheeded proposals. (Footnotes
omitted).
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ment.11 Moreover, the French Revolution, which had a compelling
influence on the Continental legal systems upon which Latin
Americans drew, was profoundly anti-judicial in nature. 12 The
Revolution's emphatic insistence on legislative supremacy, coupled
with its abhorrent excesses in the area of human rights, created
agonizing dilemmas for Latin American jurisprudence. On the one
hand, Latin American revolutionaries themselves drew spiritual
sustenance from the ideals of the French Revolution. On the other
hand, the drafters of Latin American constitutions readily adopted
the United States model, including the Bill of Rights. At issue,
therefore, was the problem of enforcing constitutionally guaran-
teed liberties against legislative and executive denials. It was at
precisely this juncture that the doctrine of judicial review came
into play.
Judicial review, as practiced in the United States, was some-
times suggested as a means of enforcing constitutional liberties
against legislative and executive actions in Latin America. Judicial
review, however, ran counter to several principles of the civil law.
Judges were not regarded as important figures in the civil law.
There was no tradition of judicial intervention into decisions or
conduct of the other branches of government. In fact, it was gener-
ally believed that the invalidation of statutes by court decision
would constitute an improper intrusion by the judiciary into mat-
ters which were by nature legislative, thus disturbing the proper
relationship between those two branches of government. 3 More-
over, in classical civil law thinking, judicial decisions are not a
source of law, at least in modern written-law societies; rather, court
decisions should have effect only upon the parties to the particular
suit.1" Thus, it was feared that judicial review would cause judicial
decisions to acquire erga omnes effect. The eventual result of this
situation was the development in many Latin American countries
of unique juridical arrangements which may be seen as both com-
promises between civil law and common law principles and as in-
digenous solutions to the problems posed by conflicting legal tradi-
tions and uniquely national needs. This Article examines the
procedures and institutions adopted and utilized by one Latin
11. J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 100-147 (1968).
12. Id. at 376.
13. See R. DAVID & H. DE VRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL
LAW SYSTEMS 30 (1958); J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 36-7 (2d ed. 1985).




American country, Costa Rica, for the adjudication of constitu-
tional questions as a method of dealing with this historical
dilemma.
It should be recalled at the outset that Costa Rica has long
been a functioning democracy with stable governmental institu-
tions a tradition of respect for law. The phrase estado de derecho
is often used to express both the continuing aspiration and the so-
cial reality of the nation. The Costa Rican Constitution (and most
of its predecessor constitutions)1 5 establishes three branches of
government: the Legislative Power, the Executive Power, and the
Judicial Power." The Legislative Power is vested in a unicameral
Legislative Assembly whose fifty-seven members are elected by di-
rect popular vote for four-year terms.17 The Executive Power is ex-
ercised by the President, who is elected by direct popular vote for
a four-year term, and by the Ministers of Government who head
the various executive departments and are appointed by the Presi-
dent.18 The country also has two Vice-Presidents, elected by direct
popular vote for terms which coincide with that of the President. 9
The judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice
(hereinafter Supreme Court) and such other tribunals as are estab-
lished by law. 20 The Supreme Court is composed of seventeen
members, called magistrates, who are elected by the Legislative
Assembly for eight-year terms, and are retained for additional
eight year terms unless opposed by a two-thirds majority of the
Legislative Assembly.21 The Supreme Court is divided into three
chambers.2 The first chamber, composed of seven magistrates, has
cassation jurisdiction in contentious-administrative matters and in
most civil and commercial matters.2 3 The second chamber, com-
posed of five magistrates, has cassation jurisdiction in cases of fam-
15. Costa Rica has had fifteen charters of a constitutional nature. I. CREEDMAN, HISTOR-
ICAL DICTIONARY OF COSTA RICA 49 (1977). Unless otherwise indicated, all constitutional ref-
erences herein are to the present Constitution, which entered into effect on November 7,
1949.
16. CONSTITUCI6N art. 9 (Costa Rica).
17. Id. arts. 105, 106, 107 (Costa Rica).
18. Id. arts. 130, 134, 138 (Costa Rica).
19. Id. arts. 135, 138 (Costa Rica).
20. Id. art. 152 (Costa Rica).
21. The number of magistrates is fixed by the Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial arts. 61,
63, 65 and 70 [hereinafter cited as LOPJ]. Their method of election and retention is estab-
lished by article 158 of the Constitution.
22. Article 157 of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall be composed
of such Chambers as shall be provided by statute.
23. LOPJ, supra note 21, art. 61.
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ily law, successions, and bankruptcy. 24 The third chamber has cas-
sation jurisdiction in criminal matters.25 The entire Court (Corte
Plena) has original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions of un-
constitutionality and petitions for habeas corpus (both of which
are discussed below), appointing members of the lower courts, ex-
ercises administrative and disciplinary control over the entire Judi-
cial Power, and resolves jurisdictional disputes between and among
its own chambers.28
There are three levels of tribunals below the Supreme Court.
They are, in ascending order, Alcaldes, district judges, and Supe-
rior Tribunals. Alcaldes have jurisdiction over minor civil matters
and are roughly equivalent to justices of the peace.27 District
judges have original jurisdiction in civil, commercial, contentious-
administrative, labor, and juvenile matters, and over lesser crimes
(delitos menores).28 Superior Tribunals, which usually sit in three-
judge panels, have original jurisdiction in major criminal cases and
appellate jurisdiction over many decisions of district judges.29 In
keeping with civil law practice, decisions of higher courts do not
constitute binding precedent for lower courts.30
Costa Rican history is typically Latin American in its search
for procedures to ensure the observance of constitutional guaran-
tees. Every constitution since 1859 has expressly provided that
constitutional norms are superior to other norms, and that all stat-
utes, decrees, and orders of the legislature or the executive which
contravene the Constitution are null and void.3 1 The early consti-
tutions, however, established no mechanisms for the enforcement
of constitutional supremacy. At various times, therefore, each
branch of government enforced the Constitution in its own way.
The foremost example of legislative constitutional review is the
Law of Nullifications of 1920. In 1917 General Federico Tinoco
Granados, the Minister of War, overthrew President Alfredo Gon-
24. Id. art. 63.
25. Id. art. 65.
26. Id. art. 71.
27. Id. arts. 89-97.
28. Id. arts. 79-81, 83, 85, 86, 88.
29. Id. arts. 78, 78 bis.
30. This principle is so fundamental and well-understood that it is not embodied in
legislation.
31. CONSTITUCI6N POLfTICA de 1859, art. 11 (Costa Rica). CONSTITUCIN POLITICA de
1869, art. 12 (Costa Rica). CONSTrrUcl6N POLfTICA de 1871, art. 17 (Costa Rica). CONSTrrU-




zalez Flores and promulgated a new constitution to replace the
Constitution of 1871. Less than three years later, the Tinoco re-
gime itself was overthrown, and the newly-convened Legislative
Assembly enacted a law annulling Tinoco's 1917 Constitution and
the legislation enacted pursuant to it as violating the Constitution
of 1871.2
A number of presidents exercised executive constitutional re-
view by declaring certain statutes unconstitutional and refusing to
enforce them. For example, in 1911 President Ricardo Jim6nez
Oreamuno declared certain tenure-of-office provisions of the Per-
sonnel Law and Secondary Education Law unconstitutional be-
cause, in his opinion, they encroached upon the President's consti-
tutional prerogative of nominating and removing employees of
executive departments.3 3
Judicial control of constitutionality began in 1888 with the
Ley Orgnica de los Tribunales, article 1 of which prohibited
judges from applying statutes or decrees which were contrary to
the Constitution. st Acting pursuant to this provision, judges at all
levels declared laws unconstitutional. The result is generally be-
lieved to have been unsatisfactory. Because Supreme Court deci-
sions did not create case-law binding on inferior courts, the consti-
tutionality of laws varied from time to time and place to place. 5
This difficulty was ameliorated somewhat by a 1922 amendment to
the Code of Civil Procedure which provided for Supreme Court re-
view of lower court decisions whenever the lower court refused to
apply a statute or decree on the ground that it was
unconstitutional.3 6
The modern system of litigating constitutional questions be-
gan with the 1938 reforms to the Code of Civil Procedure. Modern
practice is characterized by the principle that constitutional litiga-
tion should be "concentrated;" that is, constitutional questions
may be decided only in certain forms of action before designated
courts. This is in contrast to the United States where, as a general
rule, a claim or defense based on the constitution may be raised in
32. Zeled6n, Historia Constitucional de Costa Rica in DIGESTO CONSTITUCIONAL DE
COSTA RICA 6 (1946).
33. R. HERNANDEZ, EL CONTROL DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DE LAS LEYES 90-91 (1978).
34. LEY ORGANICA DE LOS TRMUNALES (1888), art. 1.
35. Costa Rica's unsatisfactory experience with pervasive or diffuse judicial review was
explained by a number of lawyers and judges.
36. C6DIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS CIVILES, art. 967, (Costa Rica 1982) (as amended by
Law of July 13, 1922).
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any proceeding, regardless of the tribunal or type of case. 7 In
Costa Rica there are six discrete methods of raising constitutional
questions: (1) the action of unconstitutionality; (2) habeas corpus;
(3) amparo; (4) ordinary contentious-administrative litigation; (5)
an opinion in response to a presidential veto-for-unconstitutional-
ity; and (6) administrative enforcement by the Procurator General.
II. THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
In most situations, the only method available to a litigant to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute or a presidential decree
having the force of a statute is by the action of unconstitutionality.
This action, which has its basis in article 10, paragraphs 3 and 4 of
the Constitution, provides:
The Supreme Court of Justice, by vote of no less than two-
thirds of all its members, has the power to declare the unconsti-
tutionality of dispositions of the Legislative Power and decrees
of the Executive Power.
It shall be determined by statute which tribunals shall have
power to hear claims of unconstitutionality of other dispositions
emanating from the Executive Power.
3 8
The action of unconstitutionality must arise out of a separate
lawsuit. This occurs when a party already in litigation believes that
a statute or decree which he contends is unconstitutional will be
applied to his disadvantage in that suit. The party then obtains a
written certification of the status of the suit from the judge before
whom it is pending. His lawyers then file a petition of unconstitu-
tionality with the Supreme Court, identifying the lawsuit, the stat-
ute or decree believed to be unconstitutional, and the constitu-
tional provisions allegedly violated. 9 Upon receipt of the petition,
the Supreme Court instructs the judge or tribunal where the peti-
tioner's case is pending to suspend proceedings in the case until
37. In the United States, a statute which purported to prohibit a court from deciding a
constitutional question in a case otherwise within that court's jurisdiction would raise seri-
ous questions concerning the constitutionality of the statute itself. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rob-
ison, 415 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1974) and cases cited therein.
38. CONSTITUCI6N art. 10 (Costa Rica).
39. C6DIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS CIVILEs arts. 962-64 (Costa Rica) [hereinafter cited as
C6D. PRO. Civ.] The gravity of the action of unconstitutionality is underscored by the fact
that it may not be brought where the underlying case is a small civil claim or minor criminal
infraction, and by the unusual requirement that the petition alleging unconstitutionality be
signed by two lawyers.
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the action of unconstitutionality is decided. The Supreme Court
also instructs all other judges and courts in the country to suspend
proceedings in any cases pending before them which involve the
allegedly unconstitutional statute or decree. The petitioner then
submits a written brief in support of his allegations of unconstitu-
tionality. All other parties to pending suits which involve the stat-
ute or decree in question are permitted, but not required, to sub-
mit briefs in the action of unconstitutionality. They are free to
argue that the statute or decree is unconstitutional for reasons
other than those asserted by the petitioner. The Public Ministry
also has the right to file a brief.40 Oral argument is not permitted;
the case is decided on the briefs. For the Court to declare a statute
or decree unconstitutional, all seventeen magistrates must partici-
pate in the decision, and at least twelve must vote for unconstitu-
tionality.41 Thus, for example, if eleven magistrates vote to declare
the law unconstitutional, and six vote to uphold its constitutional-
ity, the statute or decree is upheld as constitutional. The judgment
is communicated to all courts, which are then free to proceed with
the suspended cases in accordance with the Supreme Court deci-
sion.42 If the law is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it may not be
applied in any case then pending nor in any case commenced
thereafter. This is so because of the conjunction of two provisions
of article 10 of the Constitution, which provide:
Dispositions of the Legislative Power or of the Executive
Power which are contrary to the Constitution shall be absolutely
null....
The Supreme Court, by vote of not less than two-thirds of
all its members, has the power to declare the unconstitutionality
of dispositions of the Legislative Power and decrees of the Exec-
utive Power.43
This may be considered an exception to the rule that decisions of
higher courts do not bind lower courts. On the other hand, it might
be seen as removing a law and thus making its subsequent applica-
tion legally impossible, rather than as creating a binding
precedent.
A determination of constitutionality is likewise binding. A
40. Id. arts. 965, 966.
41. CONSTITUCION art. 10 (Costa Rica); C6D. PRO. Civ., supra note 39, art. 967.
42. C6D. PRO. Civ., supra note 39, art. 969.
43. CONSTITUCI6N art. 10 (Costa Rica).
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subsequent action of unconstitutionality against the same law will
be rejected preliminarily even if the second petitioner asserts rea-
sons for unconstitutionality which were not raised in the first
action."
III. HABEAS CORPUS
Habeas corpus has been adopted by most Latin American re-
publics to protect the constitutional rights of personal liberty and
freedom of movement.45 Article 48 of the Costa Rican Constitution
provides:
Every person has a right to Habeas Corpus whenever he be-
lieves himself to be unlawfully deprived of his liberty.
This remedy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court of Justice, which has power to order the detained
person brought before the court, which shall not be avoided by a
claim of obedience to authority or any other excuse.46
The first article of the Habeas Corpus Law clarifies the scope of
the action: "Habeas corpus is available not only against illegal de-
tention imposed by any authority, but also against any unlawful
restriction upon the right to come and go and to move about from
place to place guaranteed by Article [22] of the Constitution. '47
Although the language of article 48 seems to make habeas corpus
available against private conduct which restricts personal liberty,
there are no cases where the writ has been so utilized, and the con-
sensus is that the remedy is available only against actions of gov-
ernmental officials.48
A habeas corpus petition is commenced in the Supreme Court
44. C6D. PRO. Civ., supra note 39, art. 967; R. HERNANDEZ, EL CONTROL DE LA CONSTITU-
CIONALIDAD DE LAS LEYES 115-16 (1978). Of the eighteen unconstitutionality cases decided
between February, 1979 and March, 1982, judgments of unconstitutionality were entered in
three cases. M. RAMIREZ & G. TREJos, JURISPRUDENCIA CONsTrruClONAL 1979-1982: DIGESTO
DE JURISPRUDENCIA 145-47 (1982).
45. Fix Zamudio, Latin American Procedures for the Protection of the Individual, 9 J.
INT'L COMM. JURISTS 67 (1968).
46. CONSTITUCI6N art. 48 (Costa Rica).
47. Ley de Habeas Corpus (No. 35 de 243 de nov. de 1932), art. 1.
48. R. HERNANDEZ, LAS LIBERTADES P01BLICAS EN COSTA RICA 64 (1980). The Law of
Habeas Corpus does not expressly limit the writ to victims of governmental restraint. How-
ever, the Law makes frequent reference to "public authorities," thus providing a basis for
the conclusion that the writ lies only against official conduct.
[Vol. 17:2
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and heard in plenary session.4 Because of the importance of the
liberties involved, habeas corpus petitions take priority over all
other matters before the Court. Similarly, the action need not be
commenced by the injured person but may be brought by any rela-
tive or, indeed, any citizen. 0 Immediately upon the filing of the
petition, the President of the Court directs the authorities respon-
sible for the detention or restriction to submit a report to the
Court. The report must include a copy of the order of detention or
restriction and a "clear and explicit" statement of both the legal
and factual bases for the detention or restriction.5 1 The authorities
must submit this information to the Court within twenty-four
hours if they reside in San Jose or its outskirts, or within longer
time periods according to their distance from the capital.52 In de-
termining whether to grant the writ, the Court must consider:
(1) whether the authority responsible for the detention
or restriction had jurisdiction to order such detention or
restriction;53
(2) whether the act of which the petitioner is accused is
punishable by a law enacted prior to the act;"
(3) whether the detention is made in violation of Article 40
of the Constitution;55
(4) whether the petitioner was tried and convicted by judg-
ment of a competent authority and whether a final sentence has
been imposed upon him;56
(5) whether the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is
one which is provided for by law;57
(6) whether the order of detention or restriction of liberty
was made pursuant to a lawful suspension of individual guaran-
tees;58 and
49. LOPJ, supra note 21, art. 71(8); Ley de Hfbeas Corpus, supra note 47, art. 2.
50. Ley de Hfbeas Corpus, supra note 47, art. 3.
51. Id. arts. 5-7.
52. Id. art. 7(a),(b).
53. Id. art. 9(1).
54. Id. art. 9(2).
55. Id. art. 9(3). Article 40 of the Constitution prohibits cruel and degrading treatment,
perpetual punishment, and confiscation of property. It also provides that any statement
obtained by violence is null.
56. Ley de Hfbeas Corpus, supra note 47, art. 9(4).
57. Id. art. 9(5).
58. Id. art. 9(6). The rights guaranteed by articles 20 through 49 of the Constitution are
denominated "individual guarantees." These include freedom of speech, press, association,
and petition; freedom from unlawful detention and unlawful imprisonment; and equality
1986]
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(7) in case of a lawful suspension of individual guarantees
(as described in item 6, immediately above), whether those guar-
antees have yet been restored."
If the Court concludes that the detention or restriction is unlawful,
then it must vacate the order of detention or restriction and com-
mand the authorities to place the person at liberty.60
IV. AMPARO
The writ of amparo is probably Latin America's most impor-
tant contribution to the defense of constitutional guarantees. The
writ originated in Mexico as a procedure through which the court
would extend its protection ("amparo") to individuals whose con-
stitutional rights had been violated or threatened by governmental
officials. The Mexican amparo has been expanded by court deci-
sions, statutes, and constitutions to the point where it protects
nearly all legal norms in the nation.6 1 Elsewhere in Latin America,
amparo serves the more limited function of protecting those con-
stitutional rights which are not protected by habeas corpus. In all
countries, amparo is a speedy and summary remedy. The respon-
dent must answer the petition quickly (usually within a day or
two), the case is given high priority on the court calendar, and the
court is required to decide the matter promptly. In most countries
amparo is available only where both the- facts and the law are
clear; that is, there must be no need for extensive taking of evi-
dence or for lengthy discussion of novel or complicated questions
of law. Amparo relief usually consists of the suspensi6n of the un-
lawful conduct; that is, the court orders the offending public offi-
cial to cease the unlawful conduct and to take such affirmative ac-
tion as may be necessary to restore the complaining party to the
before the law. In contradistinction to "individual guarantees" are "social rights and guaran-
tees" (set forth in articles 50 through 74 of the Constitution) which deal with working condi-
tions and other economic matters. Freedom of religion is guaranteed by article 75 and is
thus neither an "individual" nor a "social" guarantee. Article 121(7) empowers the Legisla-
tive Assembly to suspend certain of the individual guarantees for up to thirty days. Article
140(4) empowers the President to do the same when the Assembly is in recess, but suspen-
sion by the President operates to convoke the Assembly which may then lift or maintain the
suspension of guarantees.
59. Ley de Habeas Corpus, supra note 47, art. 9(7).
60. Id. art. 10. Of the twenty-eight habeas corpus cases decided by the Supreme Court
between February, 1979 and March, 1982, relief was granted in eleven cases and denied in
seventeen. M. RAMIR9Z & G. TaEjos, supra note 44, at 145-47.
61. Fix Zamudio, A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo, 9 CLIF. W.
INT'L L. J. 306 (1979).
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full enjoyment of the right which was violated. In most countries
amparo is not the exclusive remedy for the vindication of the
rights which it protects. An injured party usually may raise the
constitutional question as part of a claim or defense in an ordinary
civil or criminal case. Ordinarily, however, litigation takes years.
Moreover, courts in civil law countries generally lack the power to
grant interim injunctive relief. Thus, as a practical matter, ordi-
nary litigation is often inadequate to vindicate constitutional
rights. The unique benefits of amparo are speed and comprehen-
sive relief.62
Article 48 of the Constitution of Costa Rica, after guarantee-
ing and defining habeas corpus, proceeds as follows: "For the
maintenance of other rights protected by the Constitution [i.e.,
constitutional rights not protected by habeas corpus] there is avail-
able to every person the writ of Amparo, which shall be heard by
such tribunals as shall be designated by statute."6 The Amparo
Law, which implements the foregoing provision, provides that
amparo is available against every disposition, act, or resolution and
against every action or omission which violates, has violated, or
threatens to violate any constitutional right not protected by
habeas corpus.64 Amparo does not lie against legislative acts,65 the
remedy in such cases being the action of unconstitutionality. Nor
is it available against judicial decisions.66 Amparo is not available
where the injured party has failed to exhaust other remedies pro-
vided by law, unless the pursuit of those other remedies will not
62. Concerning the Argentine amparo see the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice
in Siri, 239 Fallos 459, [1958-II] J.A. 478 (1957); Comment, The Writ of Amparo: A Remedy
to Protect Constitutional Rights in Argentina, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 831 (1970). Concerning Bra-
zil, whose writ of security (mandado de seguranca) is similar to amparo, see 1984 Revista do
Instituto dos Advogados da Bahia, passim (Ntimero Especial, 1984). See generally, Rosenn,
Judicial Review in Latin America, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 785, 796-804 (1974).
63. CONSTITucI6N art. 48 (Costa Rica). An excellant comparative study of the Mexican
amparo, the Argentine amparo, and the Brazilian writ of security is found in K. KARST & K.
ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 98-183 (1975).
64. Ley de Amparo (No. 1161 del 2 de junio de 1950, as amended) art. 2 [hereinafter
cited as Ley de Amparo]. The Amparo Law had originally limited the action to the protec-
tion of individual rights (as distinguished from "social" or other rights, see n. 58) guaran-
teed by the Constitution. However, in 1956 the Supreme Court held that article 48 of the
Constitution extends amparo protection to all constitutional rights not protected by habeas
corpus. (1956 Corte Plena, ses. ext. 54 de 11 de octubre, Boletin Judicial, 7 de diciembre de
1956). Thereafter the Amparo Law was amended to conform to the Supreme Court's
decision.
65. Ley de Amparo, supra note 64, art. 3(a).
66. Id. art. 3(b), (c).
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resolve the dispute within fifteen days.67
An amparo action may be commenced by any natural or jurid-
ical person.6 8 If the conduct complained of is that of the President,
a Minister of Government, a provincial governor, the Director Gen-
eral of the Civil Guard, or certain other specified police officials,
the matter is heard by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court
and is not subject to review.6 9 In all other cases it is first heard by
the criminal judge of the judicial district in which the conduct in
question occurred, 70 with a right of appeal (in the nature of cassa-
tion) to the Third (i.e. criminal) Chamber of the Supreme Court."
1
An amparo petition may be filed at any time on any day by the
injured person, a relative, or any citizen, and takes priority over all
other matters except habeas corpus.72 The petition must identify
the act or omission complained of, the constitutional right alleg-
edly violated or threatened, the official responsible for the conduct,
and the proof on which the petitioner relies.73 As with habeas
corpus, most of the formal pleading requirements are dispensed
with in amparo proceedings.74
If the petition deals with subject-matter inappropriate to
amparo (for example, a court judgment or the enactment of a stat-
ute),the petition is dismissed in limine. If the petition deals with
subject-matter within the scope of amparo, then the judge or
Chamber requires the respondent official to file a written report as
in habeas corpus. If the report disputes the facts alleged by the
petitioner, evidence is then taken.75 If serious or irreparable harm
may be done to the petitioner before the case can be decided on
the merits, the judge or Chamber may order suspension of the con-
duct complained of, pending final judgment.76 If the petitioner
prevails on the merits, the respondent is ordered to take specified
negative or affirmative steps to restore the petitioner to the enjoy-
67. Id. art. 3(d). See also 1961 Montoya Castillo vs. Gobernador de la Provincia de
Alajuela, Corte Plena, ses. ord. No. 43, 14 hrs. del 28 de agosto de 1961. (1969 Rev. Col.
Abog., No. 17, p. 805).
68. Ley de Amparo, supra note 64, art. 5.
69. LOPJ, supra note 21, art. 61(3), (amending art. 6, p. 1 of the Law of Amparo).
70. Ley de Amparo, supra note 64, art. 6.
71. Id. art. 14.
72. Id. art. 7.
73. Id. art. 8.
74. Id.
75. Id. art. 12.
76. Id. art. 13.
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ment of the right which has been violated.7 The denial of relief in
amparo is not a bar to a subsequent civil or criminal action chal-
lenging the same conduct which was the subject of the amparo
proceeding.7 8 This is so because, given the summary nature of
amparo, relief is often denied because the issues are too compli-
cated or the evidentiary needs too great to be accommodated in an
amparo proceeding. Thus, an amparo judgment denying relief is
not necessarily a determination on the merits, and therefore, bars
only subsequent amparo actions.
In deciding amparo cases, the Costa Rican courts have consist-
ently applied an "arbitrariness" test. This means that relief will be
granted only where the conduct is both unlawful and arbitrary. For
example, if the respondent official shows that he was acting pursu-
ant to or in reliance upon a statute, then his conduct was not arbi-
trary and relief will be denied even if a constitutional right has
been violated and even if the respondent's conduct was based on
an incorrect interpretation of the statute. A district judge ad-
dressed the matter in these terms:
[T]he writ of amparo lies against every... act or omission
which violates in arbitrary fashion a right protected by the Con-
stitution .... An act or omission is arbitrary when it is commit-
ted out of pure self will or caprice, without relying on existing
legislation. Even though the act is tainted with unconstitutional-
ity, amparo will not lie because that is not the way to declare
laws unconstitutional. 79
The Supreme Court has explained the "arbitrariness rule" in the
following way:
[A]cts of officials which are based on statutory mandates are
legitimate and cannot be faulted as arbitrary, because in amparo
it is the arbitrariness and the abuse of power by officials which
the law represses, not those acts which officials are empowered
by statutory precept to perform, because those precepts involve,
for the officials, the fulfillment of their duties.80
77. Id. arts. 15, 16. An amparo judgment by a district criminal judge may be appealed
to the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court for review of questions of law. Where the
amparo action was commenced in the Third Chamber, there is no review. Ley de Amparo,
supra note 64, art. 14.
78. Ley de Amparo, supra note 64, art. 21.
79. Juzgado 30 Penal, Sentencia No. 165 a las 15 hrs. del 2 de agosto de 1961.
80. Corte Plena, Sentencia No. 147 a las 14 hrs. del 21 de nov. de 1960.
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This approach has been criticized as imposing an unwarranted lim-
itation on amparo. Dr. Ruben Herndndez, Professor of Constitu-
tional Law at the University of Costa Rica, has said:
It is apparent that our courts have misinterpreted the
meaning of amparo in unduly limiting it, by judicial decisions
and without basis in legislation, to arbitrary exercises of state
power. In fact there are actions which, while not necessarily ar-
bitrary, nevertheless trample fundamental liberties of the gov-
erned. In any event, our [amparo] legislation requires only that
the act complained of violate a fundamental right which is
something quite different from requiring that the act be
arbitrary."1
This dispute illustrates the dilemma created by the interaction
of civil law and common law concepts. The civil law's deference to
the legislature is so great that an official's reliance (even misplaced
reliance) on a statute will cause the courts to refrain from examin-
ing the constitutionality of the official's conduct.82 The official's
conduct, although it may be unconstitutional, is regarded as "legit-
imate" because it has a basis in legislation. In theory, the statute
on which the official relied could be attacked directly in an action
of unconstitutionality; however, a statute which is constitutional
on its face will survive an action of unconstitutionality. If the same
statute is thereafter applied in an unconstitutional manner by a
public official, amparo relief will be denied so long as the official
relied on the statute.
Despite its limitations, amparo has often proven effective in
protecting and restoring constitutional rights. For example,
amparo has been successfully invoked to stop governmental inter-
ference with the circulation of a newspaper, 3 to require municipal
81. R. HERNANDEZ, LAS LIBERTADES POBLICAS EN COSTA RICA 68 (1980).
82. The restrictive approach of the Costa Rican courts to claims in amparo is not with-
out merit. Amparo is a summary action in all countries. It is intended to provide relief
where the petitioner's right is legally clear and the respondent's violation of that right is
factually certain. Conversely, amparo is usually inappropriate to matters which are factually
or legally complicated. See discussion in Samuel Kot, S.R.L., 241 Fallos 291, 1958-IV J.A.
227, (Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina, 1958). The same is true of the Brazilian writ of
security. See Tourinho, Direito Liquido e Certo: Expressao Atcnica, 1984 Revista do In-
stituto dos Advogados da Bahia 25-37 (Nmero Especial, 1984). When a public official acts
in reliance on a statute, the reasonableness of his reliance, the applicability of the statute,
(ultimately) the constitutionality of the statute all serve to complicate the case, perhaps
taking it beyond the reach of amparo.
83. Sdlazar Sdlazar vs. J~fe Politico de Turrialba, Juzgado Penal de Turrialba, 8:30
hrs. del 20 de nov. de 1962; aff'd Sala Segunda Penal, 16:30 hrs. del 11 de dic. de 1962 (1969
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officials to act on petitions properly filed with them '8 4 and to pre-
vent a public agency from dispossessing a private landowner.85
V. CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION
The general rule in Costa Rica is that in ordinary litigation a
court may not hear a claim or defense based on the alleged uncon-
stitutionality of a statute or decree. The action of unconstitutional-
ity exists to perform this function. There is, however, a significant
gap in the subject-matter of an action of unconstitutionality. Arti-
cle 10 of the Constitution speaks of the unconstitutionality of acts
of the Legislative Power and the Executive Power. Similarly, Book
IV, Title I, Chapter IX of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with
the action of unconstitutionality governing the terms of enact-
ments that come from either the Legislative or the Executive
Power. 6 In recent decades, however, there has been a significant
increase in the number and importance of autonomous administra-
tive agencies with rulemaking power.8 7 The rules promulgated by
these agencies are not acts or decrees of the Legislative or Execu-
tive Power and, thus, are not within the scope of the action of un-
constitutionality. For the same reason, municipal ordinances and
regulations promulgated by the Controller General also escaped re-
view. 8 Amparo is likewise ineffective, because the "arbitrariness"
doctrine protects officials who act in reliance on regulations and
Rev. Col. Abog. No. 17, p. 891).
84. Peyroutet Carricondo vs. Municipalidad de San Pedro de Montes de Oca, Juzgado
Primero Penal de San Jos6, 16:50 hrs. del 22 de nov. de 1954 (1969 Rev. Col. Abog. No. 17,
p. 891).
85. Sdnchez Ulate vs. J~fe Politico, Juzgado Penal de Cafiar, 7:30 hrs. del 20 de mayo
de 1960 (1969 Rev. Col. Abog. No. 17, p. 583). Of the nineteen amparo actions commenced
and decided in the Supreme Court from February, 1979, through March, 1982, relief was
granted in three cases and denied in sixteen. M. RAMIREZ & G. TREJos, supra note 44. For
an interesting discussion of amparo decisions during an earlier period see Donaldson, The
Costa Rican Amparo in the Period 1950-1962, 8 LAW. AM. 371 (1976).
86. Cod. Pro. Civ., supra note 39, arts. 962, 965, 967.
87. The Central Bank, the Coffee Institute, and the various integrated professional as-
sociations such as the National Bar Association are among the numerous administrative
agencies.
88. The Controller General is elected for an eight-year term by the Legislative Assem-
bly. Article 183 of the Constitution provides that although the office is an auxiliary institu-
tion of the Legislative Assembly, it enjoys absolute functional and administrative indepen-
dence. The prevalent view is that the Controller General's Office is not part of the
Legislative Power but is itself a basic organ of government. See Murillo, Naturaleza





To remedy this situation, the Contentious-Administrative Ju-
risdiction Regulatory Law, adopted in 1966, expressly extends ju-
risdiction in contentious-administrative cases to include questions
of the constitutionality of rules promulgated by administrative
agencies and municipalities.89 This means that an inferior court (a
single judge in the first instance and a multi-judge panel of a Supe-
rior Tribunal on appeal) may declare a municipal ordinance or a
rule or regulation of an autonomous administrative agency uncon-
stitutional. This places the lower contentious-administrative courts
in an exceptional position, because they have an important power
which is denied their counterparts in civil, criminal, and commer-
cial cases-the power to declare unconstitutional a normative act.
VI. RESOLUTION OF A PRESIDENTIAL VETO
All of the procedures discussed so far involve constitutional
adjudication in connection with actual cases or controversies be-
tween adversary litigants. In the Costa Rican system there is also a
procedure for adjudicating constitutional questions outside of liti-
gation. Article 128 of the Constitution provides that where the
President vetoes a bill because he believes it to be unconstitutional
and the Legislative Assembly does not delete the allegedly uncon-
stitutional provision, the Assembly is required to submit the bill to
the Supreme Court for a decision on the constitutionality of the
disputed provision. If at least two-thirds of the total membership
of the Court find the provision unconstitutional, the bill is re-
turned to the Assembly with the unconstitutional provision
stricken, and the Assembly may either pass the revised bill or
abandon the project. In the former situation, the President may
not again veto the bill on constitutional grounds because his con-
stitutional objections have been met. If fewer than twelve magis-
trates vote for unconstitutionality, the President is prohibited
from vetoing a second time on constitutional grounds because the
Court has settled the constitutional question. A determination of
89. Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdiccion Contenciosa-Administrativa (No. 3667 de 12 de
marzo de 1966), art. 20(2). The First Chamber of the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
review contentious-administrative decisions for errors of law. LOPJ, supra note 21, art.
61(1). Consequently, the Chamber may review constitutional decisions by lower courts in
contentious-administrative matters.
90. CONSTITUCM6N art. 128 (Costa Rica). See also Mu~oz LA ASAMBLEA LEGISLATIVA EN
COSTA RICA 171 (1981).
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constitutionality operates, in practice, to protect the bill from suc-
cessful challenge by action of unconstitutionality.
Although this procedure seems to involve constitutional adju-
dication in the abstract, it may be seen as arising out of an actual
controversy between the Legislative Assembly and the President.
The procedure may be adequate to determine whether the legisla-
tion is unconstitutional on its face, but it cannot address questions
of unconstitutional application, which also escape amparo review
because of the "arbitrariness" rule.
VII. ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT BY THE PROCURATOR GENERAL
The Procurator General of the Republic performs an impor-
tant role in the protection of constitutional guarantees. While his
role is not strictly adjudicatory, it is an integral part of the scheme
of enforcement gradually developed by Costa Rica. The Procurator
General is appointed by the Council of Government, with the ap-
proval of the Legislative Assembly, for a term of six years.9 ' He
acts as the technical-legal advisor to the government in matters of
public administration and represents the state in all legal proceed-
ings except the prosecution of criminal cases.92 His formal opinions
constitute operational rules binding on governmental officials in
the performance of their administrative functions.9 Since 1982,
the Procurator General has also been charged with protecting
human rights. The Organic Law of the Office of Procurator Gen-
eral, enacted in 1982, empowers the Procurator General to defend
the inhabitants of the country against any acts or omissions of
public officials or public employees which interfere with the enjoy-
ment of any individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution and
any civil or political rights enumerated in international conven-
tions to which Costa Rica is a party.94 The Procurator General is
empowered to receive complaints from any source against public
authorities, including police, and to undertake such investigations
as he deems appropriate. This investigatory power includes the
right to enter public offices without prior notice, and to inspect all
public documents and records except those which are by law confi-
91. Ley Orghnica de la Procuraduria General de Ia Reptiblica (No. 6815 del 27 de sep-
tiembre de 1982) art. 10 [hereinafter cited as LOPG]. The Council of Government is com-
posed of the President and his cabinet ministers. CONSTITUCI6N art. 147 (Costa Rica).
92. LOPG, art. 1.
93. Id. art. 2.
94. Id. art. 3(k).
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dential or which have been classified by the Council of Govern-
ment as state secrets.9 5 If the Procurator General determines that
a public official or other public employee has violated any right
guaranteed by the Constitution or a treaty, he shall direct the of-
fender's superior to impose the appropriate disciplinary sanction. "
If the violation in question also constitutes a crime, the Procurator
General so informs the Public Minister in order that criminal pro-
ceedings might be commenced. The Procurator General is also
authorized to make recommendations to government administra-
tors for the protection of human rights. 8 The human rights func-
tion of the Procurator General is quite new, dating from the pro-
mulgation of the current Organic Law in September, 1982.
Although it may be too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this
institution, its potential has been noted by a constitutional scholar
who himself served as Procurator General and, later, as Minister of
Justice.
From the statute, it is difficult to ascertain precisely the na-
ture of [the human rights] function of the Procurator. Although
the statute indicates that this function is defense, it is not de-
fense in the procedural sense. His function is much broader: [I]t
consists of preventive and educational actions for the protection
of human rights. His role is preventive in that, by simple and
direct means such as a telephone call, he warns the officials of
an evident violation of human rights; it is educational in that his
activities continuously teach officials about the law, the rights of
citizens, and the limits on the exercise of power.99
The human rights function of the Procurator General may
close the gaps in the protection afforded by the action of unconsti-
tutionality, the decision on a veto-for-unconstitutionality, and the
writ of amparo. A complaint to the Procurator General may prove
to be an effective remedy where an official has acted unconstitu-
tionally because of a misplaced reliance on a statute which has
been determined to be constitutional on its face or has not been
the subject of constitutional litigation.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. The Public Minister is an official of the Judicial Power whose duties include the
prosecution of criminal cases.
98. Id.
99. Mufloz, La Protecci6n de los Derechos Humanos por la Procuraduria General de la
Repiblica, DERECHO CONSTrrUCIONAL COSTAIuCENS 389, 400 (Guti6rrez ed. 1983).
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VIII. THE PROPOSED ORGANIC LAW OF CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISDICTION
In 1982, the Minister of Justice suggested to the President of
the Supreme Court the potential value of having a single organic
law of constitutional jurisdiction that would organize existing law
pertaining to amparo, habeas corpus, and the action of unconstitu-
tionality, and modernize constitutional adjudication to meet cur-
rent needs. In addition, the single organic law of constitutional ju-
risdiction could act to modernize the law to meet current needs.
The court, which itself had been interested in such a project for
some time, agreed. A Special committee was established, composed
of one Supreme Court magistrate and thirteen other lawyers, many
of them law professors and public officials. The committee's final
draft, Proyecto de Ley Org6nica de la Jurisdicci6n Constitu-
cional,00 has been submitted to the Legislative Assembly. The
proposed law would change constitutional adjudication in several
important respects.
The most important changes proposed in the draft are: the ex-
pansion of the action of unconstitutionality to include review of
administrative regulations; the expansion of amparo to provide
protection against conduct of private parties and to limit the de-
fenses available to governmental respondents; and the creation of
jurisdiction to resolve constitutional conflicts between branches of
government.
IX. EXPANSION OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Article 69 of the proposed draft Organic Law would broaden
the scope of the action of unconstitutionality by eliminating the
existing qualification which limits the action to "dispositions of the
Legislative and Executive Power having the force of legislation.",01
This change would make administrative regulations and municipal
ordinances subject to challenge in the same manner as statutes and
decrees, and would eliminate the present anomaly of deciding the
constitutionality of administrative regulations in ordinary conten-
tious-administrative suits.
100. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the proposed Organic Law of Consti-
tutional Jurisdiction are to the Committee draft of the "Proyecto de Ley Orgfinica de la
Jurisdicci6n Constitucional," of October, 1983 [hereinafter cited as LOJC].
101. Id. art. 69(a).
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X. EXPANSION OF AMPARO
The present Amparo Law provides that amparo shall lie
against "authorities, functionaries, and employees. 10 2 This provi-
sion has been uniformly construed as limiting amparo to acts of
persons exercising governmental authority. 03 Article 57 of the pro-
posed Organic Law would expand amparo by making it available
against private persons for any act or omission violating or threat-
ening the following constitutional rights: freedom of association
and non-association; 04 freedom of assembly; 05 freedom of expres-
sion and communication of ideas; 06 freedom from discrimination
violative of human dignity; 0 7 freedom from cruel or degrading
treatment; 08 rights of patent, trademark, or trade name; 0" free-
dom to form labor unions;" 0 and freedom of education."' Al-
though these constitutional guarantees are regarded as limiting
private conduct as well as state action," 2 the actual vindication of
these guarantees against violation by private parties to date has
been relegated to the less-effective remedy of ordinary litigation.
Bringing these guarantees within the protective scope of amparo
without regard to the public or private status of the alleged viola-
tor should have significant substantive, as well as procedural
impact." 3
102. Ley de Amparo, supra note 64, art. 4.
103. R. HERNANDEZ, LAS LIBERTADES PMBLICAS EN COSTA RICA 67 (1980), and authorities
cited therein.
104. LOJC, supra note 100, art. 57(1). Freedom of association and non-association are
guaranteed by article 25 of the Constitution.
105. LOJC, supra note 100, art. 57(2). Freedom of assembly is guaranteed by article 26
of the Constitution.
106. LOJC, supra note 100, art. 57(3). Freedom of expression and communication of
ideas is guaranteed by article 29 of the Constitution.
107. LOJC, supra note 100, art. 57(4). Freedom from discrimination violative of human
dignity is guaranteed by article 40 of the Constitution.
108. LOJC, supra note 100, art. 57(5). Freedom from cruel or degrading treatment is
guaranteed by article 40 of the Constitution.
109. LOJC, supra note 100, art. 57(6). Rights of authorship and invention and of trade-
mark and trade name are guaranteed by article 47 of the Constitution.
110. LOJC, supra note 100, art. 57(7). Freedom to form labor unions is guaranteed by
article 47 of the Constitution.
111. LOJC, supra note 100, art. 57(8). Freedom of education is guaranteed by article 79
of the Constitution.
112. This is in clear contrast to the United States Constitution, where all guarantees,
except those in the Thirteenth Amendment, are worded and have been construed as limita-
tions only on governmental conduct. See e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972).
113. In Argentina, where amparo was created by judicial decision, it has been ex-
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Another important change in the proposed Organic Law is the
narrowing of the defense available to public officials who act in re-
liance on a statute. At the present time, such reliance is a complete
defense in an amparo proceeding. The proposed Organic Law
would change this in two respects. First, where the respondent in
an amparo proceeding asserts that he is acting pursuant to a stat-
ute or other normative act which the petitioner believes to be un-
constitutional, the Organic Law would expressly permit the
amparo petitioner to commence an action of unconstitutionality.114
The commencement of this action would operate to suspend the
amparo proceeding until the constitutionality of the statute or reg-
ulation is adjudicated. If the Supreme Court determines that the
statute (or decree or regulation) is unconstitutional, article 10 of
the Constitution would preclude the respondent from invoking it
in the amparo proceeding.
The second change limiting the defense of statutory-reliance
(or "non-arbitrariness") is equally important. The proposed Or-
ganic Law expressly provides that in an amparo proceeding an offi-
cial cannot defend his actions by claiming to have acted pursuant
to a statute or other normative act if the amparo court determines
that the statute is inapplicable to the situation in question or that
the official misinterpreted the statute.1 5
These changes will not formally eliminate the judicially-cre-
ated rule that amparo will be granted only where the respondent
official has acted arbitrarily. The proposed Organic Law, however,
significantly increases the number of constitutional violations sus-
ceptible of redress, by depriving the official of the ability to rely on
an unconstitutional or inapplicable law, or on his own misinterpre-
tation of a law.
XI. JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE INTRA-GOVERNMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTES
Article 96 of the proposed Organic Law gives the Supreme
Court jurisdiction to resolve conflicts between the principal organs
of government concerning their respective powers under the Con-
panded, also by judicial decision, to protect against private conduct which violates constitu-
tional guarantees. See Samuel Kot, S.R.L., supra note 82.
114. LOJC, supra note 100, art. 29. Article 29 of the draft has since been renumbered
article 33.
115. Id. art. 29.
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stitution. If the Executive, the Legislative Assembly, the Judiciary,
the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, or the Controller General believes
that any power granted to it by the Constitution is being infringed
or usurped by any other governmental entity, it may bring the dis-
pute directly to the Supreme Court, which shall resolve the matter
in plenary session."1 This is a logical extension of the principle
underlying judicial review of the veto-for-unconstitutionality; that
the Supreme Court should be the arbiter of intra-governmental
disputes of constitutional magnitude.
XII. OVERVIEW
An overview of the Costa Rican legal system indicates that it
is a civil law system. The manner in which the laws are organized,
their sources and content, 17 the way law is taught and studied,1 8
and the way courts and judges function, all demonstrate a strong
Continental and, ultimately, Roman influence. In short, it would
be a mistake to view the Costa Rican legal system other than as
part of the civil law tradition.
The influence of the civil law is, however, attenuated by other
juridical forces. The influence of the common law tradition is read-
ily apparent in constitutional matters such as the language of nu-
merous constitutional guarantees, the remedy of habeas corpus,
and the practice of judicial review. Other influences are evident as
well. Amparo is of Mexican origin, but it has been generally
adopted throughout the region to the extent that it may be said to
be a distinctively Latin American institution. Even in the constitu-
tional area, however, the Costa Rican system is not merely the
116. Id. art. 96. Article 100 of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Electoral
Tribunal be composed of three or five members (the membership is increased at election
time) appointed for six-year terms by a two-thirds vote of the Supreme Court. The Tribunal
is responsible for the organization, direction, and safeguarding of popular elections, and en-
joys independence in the performance of its duties. Article 103 of the Constitution provides
that the decisions of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal are not subject to review, however, the
action of prevaricato is available to compel the Tribunal to act where it has a non-discre-
tionary duty to do so. Article 96 of the draft Organic Law presumably would not violate
article 103 of the Constitution, because the Organic Law would merely provide for prior
judicial determination of the Tribunal's powers, rather than subsequent judicial review of
the Tribunal's decisions.
117. Costa Rica's principal non-constitutional juridical norms are contained in the five
fundamental civil law codes: the Civil Code, the Commercial Code, the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, the Penal Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedure.




product of foreign influences. The operation and interaction of the
country's various procedures and institutions constitutes a distinc-
tively Costa Rican adaptation.
Costa Rica's approach to constitutional litigation illustrates a
number of principles which are central to the country's concept of
its Constitution and of its legal system. First, and most important,
the Constitution is treated as a set of operating legal rules. It is not
merely a statement of national aspirations; it is also a set of norms,
whose application determines the outcome of real controversies.
Second, constitutional questions are regarded as so sensitive
and qualitatively so different from other legal questions that spe-
cial procedures are necessary in constitutional matters. This is in
obvious contrast to the approach taken in the United States, where
the nature of constitutional litigation was defined by the rationale
in Marbury v. Madison: the power of the court to decide constitu-
tionality derives from the nature of the judicial duty "to say what
the law is." 9 It follows from Marbury that a court may - indeed
must - decide a constitutional question whenever the question is
raised by a litigant and the answer will effect the outcome of a
case. For a time Costa Rica employed this same approach to judi-
cial review. But the experience proved unsatisfactory in a country
system where judicial decisions do not constitute binding prece-
dent and where judges educated in the civil law tradition are often
uncomfortable with the broad political implications of constitu-
tional adjudication. Consequently, Costa Rica concluded that the
power to declare laws unconstitutional is so distinctive and so deli-
cate that it must be entrusted only to the highest court, acting by
an extraordinary majority. Similarly, the power to declare and re-
strain unconstitutional conduct by public officials is carefully allo-
cated. All habeas corpus proceedings and the most important
amparo cases are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. The exception to the special treatment of constitutional is-
sues is, of course, contentious-administrative litigation, where any
court otherwise competent to hear the case may decide constitu-
tional questions relevant to the litigation. But this exception is
likely to disappear because the proposed Organic Law of Constitu-
tional Jurisdiction would treat constitutional questions arising in
contentious-administrative litigation the same way as constitu-
tional questions arising in other types of litigation by bringing
119. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803).
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them all within the action of unconstitutionality.
Another characteristic of the Costa Rican system is the belief
that the enforcement of the Constitution should not be fortuitous
or selective, but comprehensive. The action of unconstitutionality
deals with allegedly unconstitutional legislation. Habeas corpus
and amparo afford relief where the unconstitutionality lies not in
the statute, but in the official's conduct. Judicial review of the
veto-for-unconstitutionality deals with intra-governmental dis-
putes over constitutionality. The ombudsman-like role of the Proc-
urator General is designed to provide more complete protection by
authorizing preventive action which may prove to close the spaces
between amparo and the action of unconstitutionality. The pro-
posed Organic Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction would not only
better organize existing remedies, but would also extend their
reach in important respects.
Finally, procedures for constitutional litigation are structured
to enhance, rather than disturb, traditional and constitutional con-
cepts of separation of powers. This helps to explain a number of
requirements which might strike a United States lawyer as unusual
or unnecessary. The practice of reserving most constitutional ques-
tions to the Supreme Court prevents intrusion by lower levels of
the judiciary into decisions of the higher levels of legislative and
executive authority. The requirement that a declaration of the un-
constitutionality of a law or bill be made by an absolute two-thirds
majority reflects the conviction that public policy should not be set
aside lightly, and that legislative determinations should not be in-
terfered with unless their unconstitutionality is clear. The same
principles are the basis of the "arbitrariness" test in amparo cases.
All of this corresponds to the civil law view of the limited role of
the judiciary and the paramount importance of written law, that is,
legislation. The Costa Rican courts have been criticized at times
for their reluctance to intervene in matters which the judges regard
as legislative or executive in character. It would be foolish and im-
pertinent for a foreign observer to suggest the proper balance for
Costa Rica between judicial restraint and judicial activism, but in
a functioning democracy such as Costa Rica, judicial restraint con-
stitutes deference to the democratic process. More importantly, the
debate itself is testimony to the most important quality of the
Costa Rican system: that constitutional principles are followed and
court decisions are obeyed to an extent equalled in few other
countries.
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